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Abstract
This research investigates whether and how the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal has altered
European food retailers' efforts to mitigate fraud in the international agri-food supply
chain. We construct an econometric model that matches fraud alert data from the
European Union (EU) Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) from 2006
2016 with annual data on bilateral trade flows. We find thatprior to the horsemeat
scandaldetection of fraud along the supply chain induced a small amount of trade
diversion toward third-country sources, but did not substantially affect total trade into
the EU. In contrast, in the years after the scandal, the detection of fraud by international
suppliers was substantially trade destructive. Detection of fraud reduced trade, not only
with the country from which the fraudulent product originated, but also from third-
country exporters of the same product. These findings extend beyond trade in meat
products and to importing countries outside Western and Northern Europe.
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Retailers are being much more specific about the processes involved and where
the meat should come from. No one wants to find themselves back on the front
pages for the wrong reason. Nick Allen, Director of the English Beef and Lamb
Executive, in the wake of the 2013 EU Horsemeat Scandal (Butler and Smithers,
2014).
1 Introduction
High-profile fraud scandals can alter consumer perceptions and sensitivity to food risks and1
result in substantial damage to the reputations of retailers and entire industries. The impacts2
on shareholder returns can be substantial and long-lasting. The 2013 Horsemeat Scandal in3
the European Union (EU) is perhaps the most notorious and high-profile food fraud event in4
history. In this paper, we aim to use econometric methods to investigate whether and how5
in light of the EU Horsemeat ScandalEuropean retailers' international sourcing decisions6
have changed to reduce or eliminate fraud from the food supply chain to protect product and7
brand reputation. Our objectives are threefold: (i) we seek to understand whether efforts8
to control fraud are limited to meat products or apply to a wider set of food products; (ii)9
we seek to understand whether fraud control initiatives extend beyond the importing and10
exporting countries most affected by the Horsemeat Scandal; and (iii) we seek to calculate11
the value of lost trade resulting from fraud incidents identified under the EU Rapid Alert12
System for Food and Feed (RASFF).13
We construct a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) econometric model that14
matches fraud alert data from the RASFF from 20062016 with annual four-digit bilateral15
trade flow data from UN Comtrade to compare the food retailers' international sourcing16
response to fraud detection prior to and following the Horsemeat Scandal. Our data includes17
a broad set of fraudulent products and cover various fraudulent behaviors, ranging from dying18
various animal meats to pass as beef, to mislabeling and other misrepresentations, such as19
1
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fake health certificates and products with misspecified country of origin.20
Our results indicate that, prior to the Horsemeat Scandal, detection of fraud along the21
agri-food supply chain induced a small amount of trade diversion toward third-country22
sources, but did not substantially affect total trade into the EU. In contrast, in the years23
after the scandal, the detection of fraud by international suppliers was substantially trade24
destructive. The average RASFF fraud alert in our sample reduced the targeted importer-25
exporter-product trade flow by approximately 10%, or $460,000.1 Detection of fraud reduced26
trade, not only from the country where the fraudulent product originated, but also from27
third-country exporters of the same product.28
We find that retailer initiatives to control fraud extend beyond trade in meat products29
and to countries lying outside the network of countries primarily affected by the Horsemeat30
Scandal. Since 2013, fraud detection under the RASFF network has cost international food31
suppliers a total of $5.3 billion in lost trade. Approximately 80% of these losses ($4.332
billion) were experienced by exporting firms outside the countries where the fraud products33
originated.34
This research contributes both to the literature and to policy debates on how to man-35
age fraud in the food system. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to apply36
econometric methods to examine the effects of food fraud on market outcomes. We high-37
light the role of the food retailer as a key decision maker in determining whether fraudulent38
foods enter the market. To the extent that retailers have the incentive to self-regulate when39
fraud is made known, government initiatives that identify and publicly communicate fraud40
information may be the most effective (and least cost) measures to mitigate fraud in the41
food supply chain. Moreover, our results broaden the economic effects of food fraud beyond42
price implications and beyond those actors directly implicated in the fraud event. The dis-43
proportionate economic impact of fraud on third-country exporters suggests the need for44
globalrather than local or regionalsolutions to combat food fraud.45
1Importer-exporter-product trade flow indicates the value of trade for a given product (defined at the HS
four-digit level) between a given importing country and a given exporting country.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on46
the economics of food fraud. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the economic impacts of47
the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal on EU retailers. Section 4 explains our sampling methodology,48
provides a summary of the data, and outlines the estimation strategy. Sections 5 and 649
present results and consider various robustness checks. Section 7 discusses policy implications50
and concludes.51
2 Literature Review52
Food fraud is a collective term encompassing the deliberate and intentional substitution,53
addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging, or54
making false or misleading statements about a product for economic gain (Spink and Moyer,55
2013). Coincident with the recent growth in public interest in food fraud, literature on the56
issue has expanded across a variety of academic disciplines (Smith, Manning and McElwee,57
2017). From an economic perspective, the most relevant of this literature can be divided58
into three inter-related strands: (1) understanding suppliers' incentives to engage in fraud59
(Manning, Smith and Soon, 2016; Moyer, DeVries and Spink, 2017; Song and Zhuang, 2017),60
(2) determining the economic and public health consequences of fraud (Ali Meerza and61
Gustafson, 2018; Barnett et al., 2016; Spink and Moyer, 2011; Yamoah and Yawson, 2014),62
and (3) designing optimal regulatory response (Ali Meerza, Giannakas and Yiannaka, 2018;63
Manning and Soon, 2014; Song and Zhuang, 2017; Spink, 2012).264
There are a number of factorsboth internal and external to the firmthat induce65
a supplier to engage in fraud (Smith, McElwee and Somerville, 2017). Among economic66
factors, suppliers likely have little to no flexibility in determining the price they receive for67
their product, as they often face take-it-or-leave-it offers with no ability or power to negotiate.68
As such, they may only be able to impact the net profitability of their enterprise by lowering69
2Categorization of existing literature on the economics of food fraud into three strands is based on an
informal thematic analysis conducted by the authors during the literature review process.
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costs, potentially by fraudulent means (Manning and Soon, 2014; Spink et al., 2016). Song70
and Zhuang (2017) couch food fraud as a market for lemons problem: Anonymity in71
the modern food system leaves consumers unable to discern fraudulent products and may72
cause them to avoid specific product categories altogether. Macroeconomic factors can also73
influence food fraud opportunities (Moyer, DeVries and Spink, 2017). Manning, Smith and74
Soon (2016), for example, identify the 2008 financial crisis as a partial cause of the 201375
Horsemeat Scandal. McElwee, Smith and Lever (2017) and Somerville, Smith and McElwee76
(2015) present case studies to understand specific drivers of food fraud and examine how77
criminal networks perpetuate fraud in practice.78
Spink and Moyer (2011) categorize the effects of food fraud into primary effects, clas-79
sified as food safety and public health consequences, and secondary effects, classified as80
public fear and market price impacts. We do not address the issue of primary effects here.81
Within the category of secondary effects, Yamoah and Yawson (2014) and Barnett et al.82
(2016) analyze the impacts of the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal on consumer confidence and pur-83
chasing behavior. Yamoah and Yawson (2014) use supermarket loyalty card data for 1.784
million beef burger shoppers to estimate the impact of the Horsemeat Scandal on retail sales85
value and volume. They find a decline in retail sales value and volume across consumers86
of all ages in the six consecutive weeks after the first Horsemeat Scandal announcement.87
Barnett et al. (2016) seek to identify the core issues affecting consumers' confidence in the88
food industry following the Horsemeat Scandal, particularly in the meat processing sector,89
and to explore the impact of the horsemeat incident on consumers' purchasing and eating90
behavior. Using a laboratory experiment, Ali Meerza and Gustafson (2018) show that infor-91
mation about food fraud in one country negatively affects consumer valuation of products92
not only from that country, but also from other countries.93
In the final strand on the design of public governance initiatives to manage food fraud,94
Song and Zhuang (2017) model a government-manufacturer-farmer game to identify the95
optimal punishments set by the government to minimize adulteration and maximize social96
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welfare in the context of melamine contamination of milk powder. Ali Meerza, Giannakas97
and Yiannaka (2018) develop a theoretical model that accounts for endogenous producer98
quality choice and asymmetries in the probability of fraud detection to show that increases99
in certification costs and monitoring-punishing systems can deter fraud. In contrast to100
punishment, Spink (2012) and Manning and Soon (2014) recommend improving detection101
capabilities as a means to prevent food fraud. Kowalska, Soon and Manning (2018) explain102
how inconsistency in local definitions of adulteration undermine broader public initiatives to103
address mislabeling, misrepresentation and misbranding.104
3 Background105
On January 15, 2013, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) announced that beef106
products sold in Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) tested positive for the presence of107
horsemeat (Telegraph, 2013). This announcement led to further fraud discoveries across108
France, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, Spain, Netherlands and, ultimately, exposed several109
organized fraud networks within and outside the EU (Manning, Smith and Soon, 2016).110
Economic consequences of the scandal were swift and substantial. In the months fol-111
lowing the FSAI announcement, more than 10 million suspect products were removed from112
shelves in major retailers, like Tesco, Lidl, Aldi, Iceland, and Dunnes Stores (Telegraph,113
2013). Other retailers (e.g., Sainsbury's, Asda, Waitrose, and the Co-op) removed products114
as a precautionary measure or proactively switched suppliers (e.g., Burger King) (Tele-115
graph, 2013). The scandal also induced long-term changes in consumers' purchasing behav-116
ior (Yamoah and Yawson, 2014). Consumers substituted away from products, brands, and117
foreign-sourced goods perceived as more risky (Barnett et al., 2016). Sales of red meat in118
the UK declined by 3% (8,000 tonnes) in 2013; sales of frozen burgersthe subject of the119
original FSAI announcementfell by 7.2% (Butler and Smithers, 2014). At the same time,120
sales of products perceived as less risky, such as lamb and vegetarian meat substitutes, in-121
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creased by more than 10% (Butler and Smithers, 2014). On January 16, 2013 (the day after122
the FSAI announcement), Tesco's market value dropped by 360 million EUR (Telegraph,123
2013). Approximately 20% of UK shoppers say they regard Tesco less favorably than before124
the scandal (Barnett et al., 2016).125
Several retailers stated they would substitute away from foreign-sourced products and126
toward local sources (Barnett et al., 2016). Tesco, for example, placed several full-page127
advertisements with major UK news outlets to apologize to patrons for the horsemeat con-128
tamination (Butler and Smithers, 2014). It pledged that by July 2013 it would source all129
chicken sold in its UK stores from British farms (BBC News, 27 February 2013). Other re-130
tailers, like Burger King, also switched suppliers proactively (Telegraph, 2013). This change131
in retailer behavior has led to an increase in farm assurance and country of origin schemes,132
such as Red Tractor, which is now used by all major UK supermarkets (Red Tractor, 2018).133
Figure 1: Google Trends Interest in Food Fraud (January 2006December 2017)
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We hypothesize that the 2013 EU Horsemeat Scandal was a watershed moment with134
respect to fraud mitigation, not only for the businesses mentioned above, but for the EU135
food industry more broadly. Since 2013, food fraud is a growing concern in the EU and136
globally. Figure 1, for example, shows the Google Trends index of interest for the search137
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term food fraud over time from January 2006December 2017. According to the Figure,138
January 2013the date of the FSAI announcementsaw a spike in interest in food fraud.139
Interest in the problem has gradually increased since the announcement. When consumers140
are unconcerned about fraud in the food chain and make food purchasing decisions solely141
on price, the least cost activity for a retailer is likely to turn a blind eye to fraudulent142
activity by its suppliers. However, as consumers become more aware of and concerned about143
the presence of fraud and associated health risks, the likelihood of lost sales resulting from144
the publicity generated by a food fraud incident likely serves as a motivator for retailers to145
increase the transparency and traceability of their foods.146
4 Methodology147
To formally investigate whether and how the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal has altered European148
food retailers efforts to mitigate fraud in the international agri-food supply chain, we match149
fraud detection data from the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) from150
20062016 with annual, bilateral trade data. We construct an econometric model to estimate151
the impact of a fraud alert on international trade flows prior to and following the scandal.152
Section 4.1 details our data collection strategy and presents summary statistics. Section 4.2153
lays out the econometric model.154
4.1 Data Collection and Summary Statistics155
In 1979, the EU created the RASFF system to improve food safety and assist in the flow156
of information among member countries. Currently, the RASFF network consists of the157
28 EU-member countries, plus Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Switzerland. When a158
public health or other risk is identified in the food or animal feed chain, a notifying country159
issues an alert to all other RASFF countries. These alerts include a description of the non-160
conforming product, a statement of the risk posed to food safety, and a list of the countries161
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of origin and destination.162
Between 2006 and 2016, there were over 34,000 alerts issued on the RASFF network.163
The vast majority of these alerts were triggered by detection of non-fraud-related food safety164
issues, such as food-borne pathogens, foreign objects, or spoilage. A subset of alerts (1,076)165
was issued on the basis of adulteration/fraud. This subset may include both incidents where166
the activity was intentional and unintentional. Because we are interested in understanding167
supplier response to supplier behavior that was intentional and economically motivated, we168
retain the subset of alerts which include the word fraud in the subject description. We169
further restrict our sample to alerts issued for human (rather than animal) foods.170
The final sample includes 165 alerts, including incidents ranging from fraudulent health171
certificates, to various animal meats dyed to pass as beef, to product certificates mis-172
specifying the country of origin as Korea or Japan rather than China. Because a single173
alert can include multiple importing countries, exporting countries, or subject products, we174
expand our alert data to create a unique observation for each importer-exporter-product175
mentioned in the alert. This yields 310 importer-exporter-product groups against which an176
alert was issued over our sample period. We limit our final sample to the 188 alerts where the177
offending product originated outside the RASFF network. This analytical step is to reflect178
that intra-EU trade occurs within a Customs Union, which affects not only trade flows but179
also consumer perceptions, and is consistent with previous literature (Baylis, Nogueira and180
Pace, 2010). Our fraud alert data involves 25 exporting countries, 26 importing countries,181
and 31 product categories matched at the 4-digit level of the harmonized tariff classification182
system (HS). Only one of these fraud alerts is characterized as posing a serious threat to183
human health.184
Table 1 summarizes the alert data at the 2-digit HS level both prior to and following185
the Horsemeat Scandal. Comparing the pre-Scandal rate of detection with the detection186
rate after 2013 shows a substantial reduction in fraud incidents. Of the 188 fraud incidents187
identified in our sample, approximately 80% of alerts were issued prior to the Horsemeat188
8
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Table 1: Fraud Alerts by Two-Digit HS Category
HS Product Description Pre-Scandal Post-Scandal Full Sample
02 Meat & Edible Meat Offal 26 2 28
03 Fish & Crustaceans, Molluscs 88 12 100
04 Edible Animal Products NES 3 3 6
07 Edible Vegetables & Certain Roots & Tubers 1 1 2
08 Edible Fruit & Nuts; Peel of Citrus Fruit or Melons 1 4 5
09 Coffee, Tea, Mate & Spices 1 0 1
15 Animal or Vegetable Fats & Oils 2 1 3
16 Prepared Foodstuffs & Beverages 23 1 24
17 Sugars & Sugar Confectionery 1 0 1
19 Preparations of Cereals, Flour, Starch or Milk 2 2 4
20 Preparations of Vegetables, Fruits, & Nuts 0 4 4
21 Miscellaneous Edible Preparations 1 7 8
22 Beverages, Spirits & Vinegar 0 1 1
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts 1 0 1
Total 150 38 188
Scandal, suggesting fraud was detected at a rate of 21 incidents per year. Following the189
FSAI announcement in January 2013, 38 incidents were identified, a rate of 9.5 per year.3190
In some sense, the decreased rate of fraud detection per year runs counter to expectations.191
One might expect that, in light of the widespread media coverage related to the Horsemeat192
Scandal, customs authorities would increase the scrutiny of inspections with respect to fraud,193
leading to an increase in the rate of fraud detection. Industries' own response is perhaps194
the most reasonable explanation for this slowdown in annual RASFF fraud detection rates.195
Food retailers likely shifted away from sources with a higher probability of fraud following196
the scandal. A comparison of fraud detected in HS 02, under which the fraudulent horsemeat197
products were traded, is most indicative on this point. Prior to the scandal, HS 02 was the198
second most common fraud category, with a rate of 3.7 incidents per year. After the scandal,199
fraud detection in HS 02 fell to less than one incident per year. HS 03fish, crustaceans,200
and molluskswas the sector with which fraud was most frequently associated prior to and201
following the Horsemeat Scandal.202
3The decrease in detections per year is not universal across all products. For example, product categories
like edible fruits (HS 07) and prepared vegetables, fruits, & nuts (HS 20) experienced an increase in detections
per year. However, overall, annual detection rates are less frequent in the years following the scandal.
9
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Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Fraud Alerts
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Number of Alerts
0
1 to 5
6 to 10
11 to 15
16 to 20
31 to 35
NA
(b) Exporting Country
Number of Alerts
0
1 to 10
11 to 25
26 to 50
>50
NA
10
Schaefer, Scheitrum, and Nes (2018) September 18, 2018
The maps in Figure 2 show the geographic distribution of fraud alerts. Panel (a) indicates203
the count of RASFF fraud alerts reported by importing country; panel (b) gives the count204
by attributed exporting country. As is evident from the maps, all but one RASFF country205
(Croatia) detected fraud over the sample period and fraud was most prevalent in Spain and206
Germany. Panel (b) highlights the diversity of exporting countries who engage in fraud. Our207
sample includes food fraud originating on every continent except Australia. In our sample,208
China is by far the most frequent origin country outside the RASFF network for fraudulent209
products.4210
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Pre-Scandal Sample Post-Scandal Sample Full Sample
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Min Max
V alueiep 489,556 5.36 277,142 6.21 766,698 5.67 0.00 21.97
(5.94) (5.93) (5.95)
FXX 489,556 3.08 277,142 3.33 766,698 3.17 1.54 10.34
(2.72) (2.77) (2.74)
FXM 489,556 0.29 277,142 0.42 766,698 0.34 0.69 5.64
(1.22) (1.25) (1.23)
GDPX 489,556 24.80 277,142 25.13 766,698 24.92 16.83 30.56
(2.29) (2.28) (2.29)
GDPM 489,556 26.81 277,142 26.79 766,698 26.80 22.63 28.99
(1.50) (1.48) (1.49)
Own Alert 489,556 0.00 277,142 0.00 766,698 0.00 0 1
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Third-Country Alert 489,556 0.03 277,142 0.02 766,698 0.03 0 1
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
Year 489,556 2008.99 277,142 2014.48 766,698 2010.98 2006 2016
(2.00) (1.12) (3.15)
Variables V alue and GDP are specified in natural logarithmic form.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
We match the fraud alert data at the 4-digit HS level with annual bilateral trade flow211
data (in nominal US$) obtained from the UN Comtrade database (United Nations Statistics212
Division, n.d.). We queried the database for all imports into RASFF countries from exporting213
4Note that, although China has the highest number of RASFF fraud alerts in our sample, this does not
necessarily imply that China has the highest incidence of fraud. China is subject to very rigorous testing
requirements, and other countries not subject to the same testing regime may have equal or higher incidence
of fraudulent activity.
11
Schaefer, Scheitrum, and Nes (2018) September 18, 2018
countries outside the EU for the 44 product categories for which alerts containing the word214
fraud were issued. The final dataset contains all importer-exporter-product groups for215
which there was at least one non-zero trade flow over the period of observation. For these216
importer-exporter-product groups, we include in the dataset all zero trade flows. We include217
standard gravity controls for importing- and exporting-country GDP and exchange rates218
obtained from the World Bank. Our sample includes 31 importing countries, 185 exporting219
countries, 43 products, and 818,448 observations over the sample horizon. Table 2 presents220
summary statistics.221
4.2 Econometric Model222
We construct an econometric specification based on the gravity model from the international223
trade literature. At any time t, the value of bilateral trade (T ) in product k between exporting224
country j and importing country i is a function of the economic mass of countries i and225
j (measured in terms of GDP), exchange rates (FX), the fraud-risk profile of the product,226
and a set of controls (Z). We specify the model as follows:227
Tijkt = αGDP
β1
it GDP
β2
jt exp[β3Akij,t−1 + β4HtAkij,t−1 + β5Aki∼j,t−1 + β6HtAki∼j,t−1
β7FXjt + β8FXit + θZkij]kjit (1)
We include two variables to quantify the effects of fraud detection on international sourc-228
ing. The first is the Own Alert effect of an RASFF alert (denoted Akij), which measures229
the impact of an RASFF fraud alert on trade value within the importer-exporter-product230
category against which the alert was issued. Variable Akij is an indicator that takes the231
value one in periods in which a fraud alert is issued, and zero otherwise. In addition to this232
Own Alert effect, we include a variable to measure the effect of an RASFF fraud alert on233
third-country exporters (denoted Aki∼j). The negative reputational effect of fraud detection234
12
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may affect all trade in the product regardless of the country of origin. Qualitative and anec-235
dotal evidence suggests that the Horsemeat Scandal changed consumers' relative valuation236
of foreign versus domestically produced foods (Barnett et al., 2016; Butler and Smithers,237
2014). This third-country effect is also consistent with previous literature on the economics238
of food safety border rejections (Baylis, Martens and Nogueira, 2009; Jouanjean, Maur and239
Shepherd, 2015). Variable Aki∼j is an indicator that takes the value one if an alert was issued240
against product k for another exporting country than j, and zero otherwise.241
Because our primary question of interest is whether the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal altered242
importing firms' sourcing behavior with respect to fraud alerts, we create an indicator vari-243
able Ht equal to one from 2013 onwards, and zero otherwise. The interaction between Ht244
and fraud alert variables Akij and Aki∼j provides a nested specification that allows sourcing245
decisions to change due to the scandal. Because post-Scandal trade effects are estimated via246
nested parameter H, the total magnitude of these effects is the sum of the pre- and post-247
Scandal coefficients. Statistical (and economic) significance on the post-Scandal interaction248
coefficient suggests that sourcing behavior has changed as a result of the scandal.249
We evaluate the effects of an alert with a single-period time lag (i.e., variables Akij and250
Aki∼j issued at time t − 1 affect trade in time t). This modeling choice is made for several251
reasons. First, alerts are issued throughout the year, but our trade data is annual. Thus,252
the contemporaneous specification treats alerts issued at the beginning of January in the253
same way as alerts issued at the end of December. The lagged specification allows us to254
evaluate the effects of alerts issued at different times throughout the year with equivalency255
in the duration of treatment. A related issue is that an importing firm's response to fraud256
detection may not be instantaneous. Importing firms may import only seasonally or be257
committed to existing contracts with exporting firms. Finally, there is likely simultaneity258
bias between variables Akij and Tkij. To see this, imagine that, for each unit of product k259
imported between countries i and j, there is a non-zero probability σ that the product is260
fraudulent. If σ is constant with respect to the volume of trade, an increase in the volume of261
13
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trade increases the probability of a fraud alert. The lagged specification reducesbut does262
not cure (Bellemare, Masaki and Pepinsky, 2017)5endogeneity concerns with respect to263
variable Akij and Tkij.264
Control vector Z includes importer-exporter-product level fixed effects and year fixed265
effects. The first set of fixed effects control for time-invariant relationships between importing266
and exporting countries, such as proximity, similar languages, and colonial relationships.267
It also controls for agro-ecological growing conditions in the exporting country, including268
climate zones and the availability of arable land, and time-invariant product demand factors269
within the importing country. Year fixed effects control for EU wide changes in laws or other270
policies affecting trade. The variation used to identify the effect of a food fraud incidence in271
product sourcing is, therefore, the time variation within exporter-importer-product category272
from 2006 to 2016.273
We use the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) method to estimate equation274
(1). Under PPML, equation (1) is estimated in its multiplicative form (Silva and Tenreyro,275
2006). This method avoids many of the pitfalls associated with the standard procedure276
of log transformation and reduced-form ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Variable277
Tijkt includes a large amount of zero trade flows, and log-transformed OLS drops all zero278
observations. In contrast, PPML allows for inclusion of zero trade flows. Log transformation279
also leads to inconsistent OLS estimation due to heteroscedasticity in the error term (Silva280
and Tenreyro, 2006).6281
5Bellemare, Masaki and Pepinsky (2017) argue thatin cases where there exists a simultaneity bias
between the independent and dependent variableusing the lag of the dependent variable changes the
channel through which the endogeneity occurs. They argue that in order for the estimates to be unbiased,
one must assume no serial correlation exists among the unobserved sources of endogeneity. This assumption
is not testable.
6In equation (1), it is assumed that E[kjit]=1. For the log transformation to be consistent, we need
E[log(kjit)]=0. This requires that log(E[kjit])=E[log(kjit)], which Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show is not
true if there is heteroscedasticity in the error term.
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5 Results282
Table 3 presents estimation results. Column (1) contains results for the full sample of283
importer-exporter-product groups; columns (2) through (5) split the sample into various284
product, importing-country, and exporting-country groups to investigate robustness. Col-285
umn (6) aggregates trade flows across importing countries to treat the EU as a single entity.286
Control variables for importing- and exporting-country GDP and exchange rate are gener-287
ally of the expected sign across all specifications. Results for our variables of interestOwn288
Alert, Own Alert Post-Scandal, Third-Country Alert, and Third-Country Alert Post-289
Scandalare presented in the first four rows of the Table. We deduce the effects of the 2013290
Horsemeat Scandal on industry fraud governance and broader implications for the global sup-291
ply chain by comparing variable Own Alert with Own Alert Post-Scandal and variable292
Third-Country Alert with Third-Country Alert Post-Scandal.293
Turning to the primary results in Column (1) of Table 3, the coefficient on Own Alert294
is statistically insignificant and positive. This result suggests thatprior to the Horsemeat295
Scandalthe detection of fraud by the RASFF network did not result in a measurable296
impact on trade with the country from which the fraudulent product originated. In contrast,297
the coefficient on Own Alert Post-Scandal is negative and statistically significant. The298
detection of food fraud following the Horsemeat Scandal induced a 10.36% (-18.2% + 7.8%)299
reduction in trade from the targeted country. These results indicate that the 2013 Horsemeat300
Scandal substantially altered sourcing decisions. After the scandal, retailers are incentivized301
to mitigate fraud and react to instances of food fraud detected in imports to their own302
country by avoiding or reducing imports of the alerted product from the offending country.303
Prior to the scandal, this incentive was not present; we do not observe evidence of response304
to food fraud incidents.305
The stark change in the response to fraud detection also extends to the treatment of third306
countries. The coefficient estimate for Third-Country Alert is positive and statistically307
significant at 99% confidence, suggesting that, prior to the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal, detection308
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of fraud by one country resulted in approximately 7.6% trade diversion toward third-country309
exporters.7310
Following the scandal, however, the detection of fraud resulted in a 6.7% contraction311
(-14.3% + 7.61%) in trade with third-country exporters. This result is also statistically312
significant at 99% confidence. These results are consistent with the findings in Barnett et al.313
(2016) that consumers now have less trust in foreign-produced foods and have turned to local314
sources. As a result of the scandal, fraud detection has shifted from a trade diversionary315
event to a trade destructive event. Retailers reduce imports not only from countries from316
which fraudulent products originate, but also from third-country exporters.317
The shift away from fraud-originating and third exporting countries as a result of fraud318
detection and the post-Scandal destructive nature of fraud on trade are robust across a319
range of alternative specifications on product, importing country, and exporting country.320
Our first robustness check relates to the product scope of the effects discussed above. One321
could imagine the EU Horsemeat Scandal fundamentally altered consumer and producer322
sensitivity to fraud in relation to trade in meat products, but left other agri-food product323
markets unaffected. In column (2) of Table 3, we re-estimate equation (1) excluding trade324
in meat and edible meat offal (HS02). Results are qualitatively similar to Column (1). As in325
Column (1), the point estimate on Own Alert is positive (10.6%), while the point estimate326
on Own Alert Post-Scandal is negative and large in magnitude.8 Together, the coefficients327
imply the post-Scandal effect of fraud detection for products outside HS02 is a 9.9% reduction328
(-20.5% + 10.6%) in trade with the country from which the fraudulent product originated.329
Findings for products outside HS02 also hold in relation to third-country effects. Column (2)330
results for pre-Scandal third-country trade diversion were 8.6%, compared to 7.6% for the331
7We attribute this pre-Scandal trade diversion to retailer behavior, but one reviewer offered an interest-
ing counter-hypothesis based on the presence of illicit chains that continue operation after detection and
intentionally mis-specify the origin country for future shipments. Such a hypothesis is rooted in historically
observed fraud activity, such as Chinese honey imports into the U.S. We acknowledge that such activity
undoubtedly takes place in our sample, but we believe thatin the aggregatethe impact of the issue is
small relative to changes in retailer sourcing behavior and likely unobservable at the country level.
8We note that the statistical significance on Own Alert in Columns (2), (4), and (5) are likely the results
of the endogeneity discussed in Section 4.2 and Bellemare, Masaki and Pepinsky (2017).
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full sample. After the scandal, fraud detection reduced third-country trade by a predicted332
5.8% (-14.4% + 8.6%), compared to 6.7% for the full sample.333
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 investigate whether our results are local to one or more334
importing countries. We hypothesize that the incentives for fraud deterrence are greatest in335
countries most affected by the Horsemeat Scandal and countries with the highest disposable336
incomes. These hypotheses appear to holdat least in relation to the Own Alert effect.337
Scandal sourcing effects also extend to other importing regions (though effects are smaller338
in magnitude). Column (3) restricts estimation of equation (1) to importing countries in339
Northern and Western Europe.9 Column (4) presents results for all other importing countries340
in the RASFF network. Consistent with Column (1), results for both country groups suggest341
fraud detected prior to the Horsemeat Scandal did not reduce trade with the country from342
which the fraudulent product originated, whereas fraud detected following the scandal had343
a negative, statistically significant effect on targeted trade flows. However, the magnitude of344
the post-Scandal trade effects differs between country groups. When the sample is limited345
to importing countries in Northern and Western Europe, detection of fraud induced a 22.5%346
reduction (-30.2% + 7.95%) in trade with the country from which the fraudulent product347
originated. In other RASFF importing regions, the corresponding reduction was only 6.61%348
(-16.2% + 9.59%). Third-country effects in Columns (3) and (4) are also consistent with the349
full-sample findings. Pre-Scandal effects in Northern and Western Europe and other RASFF350
importing countries are positive trade diversion of 8.7% and 7.8%, respectively. Post-Scandal351
effects are -5.8% (-14.5% + 8.7%) and -9.2% (-17.0% + 7.8%).352
In Column (5) we investigate the exporting-country scope of our findings. The data353
limit this analysis to consideration of Asian exporters; only 12 of 38 fraud alerts after 2013354
originate from non-Asian countries. Column (5) reports results for Asian countries. The355
direction of the estimates is consistent with those from Columns (1) through (4). However,356
the effects are magnified. In the wake of the Horsemeat Scandal, the own effect fell from357
9These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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17.4% to -30.7% (-48.1% + 17.4%). The third-country effect fell from 13.9% to -23.9%358
(-37.8% + 13.9%).359
Finally, free trade within the EU means that the country where the alert arises is not360
necessarily the country where the food is destined. If fraudsters believe that some border361
inspection points are less rigorous in terms of surveillance and application of regulations362
than others, they may target those less rigorous border points more than others. In column363
(6), we control for this by aggregating all importing country trade flows to treat the EU as364
a single entity. Results are robust to this specification. Following the Horsemeat Scandal,365
the own effect fell from to 13.8% to -7.6% (-21.4% + 13.8%). The third-country effect366
fell from 4.71% to -5.39% (-10.1% + 4.71%).367
6 Post-Scandal Trade Impact368
Because trade values (in US$) vary substantially across importer-exporter-product groups,369
we assess the magnitude and distribution of a single fraud incident on international trade370
following the 2013 EU Horsemeat Scandal as follows:371
Vˆ Ownijkt = (βˆ3 + βˆ4)AkijtHtTijk,t+1 (2)
372
Vˆ Thirdijkt = (βˆ5 + βˆ6)Aki∼jtHtTijk,t+1 (3)
where Vˆ Ownijkt is the predicted value of lost trade in importer-exporter-product category ijk re-373
sulting from a post-Scandal Own Alert and Vˆ Thirdijkt is the predicted value of lost trade result-374
ing from a post-Scandal Third-Country Alert. All other variables (β3, β4, β5, β6, Akijt, Aki∼jt,375
and Tijk,t+1) are defined as in equation (1).376
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Figure 3: Post-Scandal Impact of a Fraud Detection Event
(a) Own Alert Impact (Vˆ Ownijkt )
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(b) Third-Country Impact (Vˆ Thirdijkt )
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Panels (a) and (b) plot Ln(|Vˆ Ownijkt |+ 1) and Ln(|Vˆ Thirdijkt |+ 1) for visual clarity. Natural log is used to re-scale values over a
more-condensed range. Absolute value is used because all values of Vˆ Ownijkt and Vˆ
Third
ijkt are less than or equal to zero, and
natural log is defined only for values greater than zero. Likewise, we add one because natural log is undefined at zero. The
term excludes outside values signifies that statistical outliers have been included to construct the box and whiskers but
are not visually depicted in the Figure.
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The box-and-whisker plots in Figure 3 show the distributions of Vˆ Ownijkt and Vˆ
Third
ijkt .
10 As377
shown in panel (a) of the Figure, the median Own Alert impact of a single fraud alert is378
a $460,000 reduction in trade. When product category HS02 is excluded from the analysis,379
the Own Alert reduction in trade is approximately $500,000 at the median. Western and380
Northern Europe appear to be especially vigilant in controlling food fraud. In addition to381
having a larger proportionate impact on trade (Table 3, Column (3)), fraud appears to occur382
predominantly in product categories with a low value of trade. The median impact of a fraud383
detection event is a $43,000 reduction in trade. In contrast, fraud incidents in other importing384
countries occur in product categories with a high value of trade. In spite of having a small385
percentage impact on trade (Table 3, Column (4)), an own alert fraud incident results386
in a median reduction in trade of $4.2 million. Asian exporters also experience a greater-387
than-average impact on trade. At the median, a single fraud incident costs Asian exporters388
approximately $1.8 million in lost trade. This is likely consistent with consumer perceptions389
of greater risk associated with Asian countries. China, for example, has had several food390
fraud incidents considered a severe risk to human health, such as the 2008 milk scandal.391
Turning to Panel (b) of Figure 3, the third-country effect of a single fraud incident is392
extremely small for a given importer-exporter-product category. The median impact, evalu-393
ated across the full sample, is $113 in lost trade per fraud incident, as measured in equation394
3. Excluding product category HS02, the impact is $108. As with the own alert effect,395
there is a dramatic difference between third-country effects inside and outside Western and396
Northern Europe. Among Western and Northern Europe importers, a fraud alert against397
one exporter reduces for the median third-country exporter by only $23. In contrast, the398
corresponding third-country effect for importers outside of Western and Northern Europe is399
$1,188. Asian exporters experience a third-country effect of $380 per fraud incident.400
However, although the third-country effects for a single exporter and for a single product401
10Note thatbecause estimation for the EU as an aggregate region, shown in column (6) of table 3, is
not directly comparable to single-importing-country results from columns (1)(5) of the tablewe omit
discussion of the aggregate EU results from this section. However, estimates are displayed in table 4.
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are small on average, there are many third-country exporters affected by a single fraud alert.402
When effects are summed across all affected exporters, the third-country effects dwarf the403
own alert effects. We calculate the total cost of fraud detection on international trade404
following the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal as follows:405
Vˆ R =
∑
ijkt
Vˆijkt R ∈ {Own, Third} (4)
406
Vˆ Total = Vˆ Own + Vˆ Third (5)
Table 4 presents these calculations. Since the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal, detection of fraud407
has reduced trade with countries from which fraudulent products originated by approximately408
$1 billion. As a result of this detection, trade with non-offending, third-country exporters has409
fallen by approximately $4.3 billionmore than 400% that for the perpetrating countries.410
Thus, the total effect of fraud detection since 2013 has been a $5.3 billion reduction in trade,411
about a 3% loss in the total value of trade in these product categories. Note that the estimates412
shown in Table 4 are not summative. For example, the impact for Western Europe plus413
impact for All other Importers is not equal to the Full Sample impact because each414
estimate is derived from independent regression coefficients. Nevertheless, findings hold up415
relatively well with comparisons across specifications.416
Table 4: Total Impact of Fraud on International Trade (million USD)
Own Alert(Vˆ Own) Third-Country (Vˆ Third) Total (Vˆ Total)
Affected Estimated Affected Estimated Affected Estimated
Category IEP Groups Impact IEP Groups Impact IEP Groups Impact
Full Sample 21 -$982 2,507 -$4,300 2,528 -$5,282
Excluding HS02 20 -$933 2,187 -$3,500 2,207 -$4,433
Western Europe 11 -$108 1,513 -$967 1,524 -$1,075
All other importers 10 -$597 994 -$4,380 1,004 -$4,977
Asia Exporters 9 -$702 809 -$4,260 818 -$4,962
Note: Estimates are derived via separate regressions (shown in Table 3) and are not summative.
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7 Policy Implications and Conclusion417
This research investigates whether food retailers take actions to mitigate the risk of food fraud418
in the international supply chain in light of increasing global concern for the issue. We match419
fraud alert data for years 20062016 from the European Union (EU) Rapid Alert System for420
Food and Feed (RASFF) database with bilateral trade flows into the European Union at the421
4-digit product level of the Harmonized Tariff System. Our results indicate that the 2013 EU422
Horsemeat Scandal was a watershed event with respect to private fraud governance in the EU423
global food supply chain. Food retailers have changed their procurement behavior as a means424
to shore up brand equity and consumer trust. Prior to 2013, fraud events resulted in a small425
amount of trade diversion towards third-countries, but did not have a statistically significant426
effect on trade with the country from which the fraudulent product originated. Following427
the scandal, detection of fraud resulted in a substantial contraction (approximately 10%)428
in bilateral trade with the fraud-originating country. Since 2013, the average fraud incident429
reduced the value of trade from the country in which the fraud originated by almost $460,000430
per year.431
Moreover, fraud detection not only reduces trade from the fraud-originating exporting432
country, but also generates a negative externality for third-country exporters of the same433
product. Aggregating across exporting countries, this third-country effect dwarfs the primary434
effect. Since 2013, fraud events have cost countries from which the fraudulent products435
originated almost $1 billion and third-country exporters an additional $4.3 billion. When436
importers react to alerts by substituting away from source countries where no food safety or437
adulteration threat exists, deadweight loss to industry and society can result. Foreign export438
industries may be denied access to international markets and domestic consumers may be439
forced to pay higher food prices.440
This research is not without limitations. Fraud activity that could potentially be char-441
acterized by the media as more duplicitous or posing a greater risk to human health would442
likely have a greater impact on trade than activity that does not. We are only able to443
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calculate an average trade effect across all fraud events prior to and following the Scan-444
dal. Our data do not allow us to differentiate between different forms of fraudulent activity445
(e.g., economically motivated adulteration versus mislabeling). Similarly, we are unable to446
distinguish fraud events that pose major public health risks versus events with no short- or447
long-term implications for human health.448
Importantly, the impact on the international market is also only a partial measure of the449
total social welfare effect of food fraud. As retailers move away from high-risk international450
sources, the increase in the transparency and traceability of the EU agri-food economy likely451
generates additional benefits to EU consumers and producers. Some portion of the losses452
to international exporting countries may be offset due to increases in purchases (and prices)453
for domestic suppliers. As a result of the fraud, consumers may also be forced to pay higher454
prices or be deprived of access to certain food products. Reduction in the incidence of fraud455
may also alter the consumer utility calculus with respect to consumption of certain food456
products or categories. Our analysis does not account for these effects and cannot separate457
trade effects due to a reduction in total demand versus substitution towards domestic sources.458
Limitations notwithstanding, the results areat least in some sensea ringing endorse-459
ment for food safety information networks like the RASFF. When such networks are used,460
the benefits of fraud identification extend beyond the removal of the non-compliant product.461
Our findings indicate that the publicity generated by RASFF fraud alert information is a462
motivator for long-term behavior change. Retailer adaptation can ensure food products are463
safe and quality assured in the future. Many European retailers, for example, now use private464
food safety standards, such as GLOBALG.A.P. and BRC Global, that enable international465
suppliers to assure the quality of their products through third-party certification schemes.466
Exporting countries can facilitate this process through the adoption of local voluntary stan-467
dards certification schemes that function as a stepping stone to GLOBALG.A.P. or BRC468
Global compliance.469
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